E 502

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

February 11, 1980

In fact, the Soviets direct very little of their military effort toward Third-World contingencies, and their current intervention capability is far inferior to our own, which remains quite robust.

The Soviet naval infantry (marine corps) numbers only 12,000 men, compared with 184,000 U.S. Marines. The Soviet amphibious fleet has only one-third the American carrying capacity. The Soviet airlift force can lift only half what U.S. aircraft can move, in millions of ton-miles per day. The U.S. Navy has 14 aircraft carriers operating or under construction, against only five much smaller and less capable Soviet carriers. The Soviets lead the U.S. only in airborne and airmobile troops, 56,000 to 39,000.

Overall, the U.S. now spends 25 percent to 35 percent of its military budget on forces appropriate for third-world intervention—more than we spend on our entire strategic nuclear force—while the Soviets devote less than 10 percent of their defense effort to the same mission. They direct their military effort almost entirely against their chief great-power rivals—the U.S., the other NATO states and China.

We should imitate this Soviet example. Soviet military power is the principle danger we face, and we should buy forces which confront it more directly. Intervention forces fail to do this, so our current investment in intervention capability is arguably too large, rather than too small.

In short, no defense budget increase is justified today, least of all the increase in intervention forces recommended by the President. * * * ●

MRS. JUNE SUNDMACHER

HON. CARLOS J. MOORHEAD

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1980

• Mr. MOORHEAD of California. Mr. Speaker, the Burbank municipal court will be losing a devoted and capable public servant on March 30, 1980.

What makes the retirement of Mrs. June Sundmacher special is that she began work for the Burbank police court as a clerk typist in 1943.

Since that time, she has shown exemplary dedication to duty, a willingness to work, a capacity for growth, and a friendly affability which has endeared her to her coworkers, made her successful and as close to being indespensable as any of us ever gets.

She has held every position in the court except that of judge, and with her experience and expertise, she probably would have done a first-rate job in that esteemed position. Mrs. Sundmacher has also been active in the community and the courts legal associations.

I want to take this opportunity to recognize the contributions Mrs. June Sundmacher has made to her profession, to her city, to her State, and to society as a whole during more than 36 years of dedicated service.

REBUILDING THE CIA

HON. STEVEN D. SYMMS

OF IDAHO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1980

 Mr. SYMMS. Mr. Speaker, the following article from the January 31 Wall Street Journal discusses the need to provide the CIA with more flexibilby repealing the burdensome Hughes-Ryan amendment; a measure which passed in 1974 during the period when our intelligence were being closely scrutinized for alleged abuses. The article points out that if the CIA is to do the job for which it was originally chartered, the Congress is going to have to limit the reporting requirements of the Agency to two House and Senate committees as opposed to the present eight in order to prevent security leaks. Increasing the CIA's budget is also discussed so that the Agency would be able to improve its intelligence-gathering capabilities.

I have introduced the Intelligence Reform Act of 1980, H.R. 6314, in the House which Senator Moynihan is sponsoring on the Senate side. This bill would accomplish the needed changes which are discussed in the Wall Street Journal article and would provide the American President with much better intelligence information than he is now receiving due to current restraints on the agencies. With more forewarning, perhaps we could have avoided some of the crises in Iran and Afghanistan, or at least have prepared a better response.

I urge my colleagues to read the following article and to pledge their support for this legislation:

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 31, 1980]

REBUILDING THE CIA

With Congress back in town, all of a sudden everyone on Capitol Hill is asking where was the Central Intelligence Agency as events unfolded in Iran and Afghanistan. If U.S. intelligence operations had been more effective, the nation's affairs in that region most likely would not be in such terrible shape. These questions are giving rise to calls for rebuilding the CIA.

If Congress is serious about revitalizing the agency, there are certain questions it must ask itself first. Has it had enough of the witch-hunt syndrome of the 1970s, when some Congressmen prided themselves on "exposing" alleged CIA abuses? Does it now accept, after detailed investigation, that most of these charges were much ado over not very much? That while CIA funds went to the opposition of Chilean President Allende, for example, there is nothing to suggest CIA involvement in the coup that overthrew him. Is Congress ready to recognize that its own attacks on the agency seriously impaired the nation's ability to maintain an effective influence abroad?

Does Congress believe that the U.S. needs the capacity to conduct covert operations overseas? That is, should the U.S. actively try to prevent an unfriendly power, most particularly the Soviet Union, from destabilizing and then taking control of a country or region vital to our national security? Does the Congress recognize that successful covert operations may ward off a possible

situation that might give way to direct military conflict, most notably in the Persian Gulf region?

If the Congress cannot agree to halt the witch-hunts, to maintain strict security about CIA activities, to accept covert operations abroad, then there is no point in discussing the reconstruction of the CIA. If Congress does not trust the President with the power to conduct such operations, under the type of congressional oversight that existed before the CIA was gutted, it may as well vote to abolish the agency altogether. On the other hand, if Congress is ready to rebuild the CIA, then it should get on with the job immediately. A number of "fixes" are easily available.

The most essential of these is repeal of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, passed with minimal debate in 1974 during the heyday of the CIA "exposures." Unwilling to face squarely the prospect of outlawing covert operations abroad, CIA opponents moved to make them administratively impossible, by requiring that they be reported to no fewer than 61 Senators and 134 Representatives on eight committees, plus their associated staff. Obviously, nothing covert is possible under such restrictions.

The risks of a breach of security are so numerous that, according to CIA director Stansfield Turner, on at least one occasion an allied intelligence service "withdrew a proposal for joint action." Former director William Colby said that "every" new project subjected to the Hughes-Ryan procedure in 1975 was leaked. Senator Moynihan has now introduced legislation to repeal the amendment; we only hope that this essential item of business will not be delayed by the inevitable debate on the First Amendment issues raised by other items in the Moynihan package.

Similarly, we would hope that revitalization of the CIA does not have to await a "charter" spelling out what is and is not proper in every conceivable contingency. The Senate Intelligence Committee has been working on such a charter, and would be wiser to scrap the whole project. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers branded the draft proposal, another artifact of the "exposure" heyday, as "long on restrictions, short on flexibility to adjust to changing situations and lacking incentives for greater excellence in intelligence." President Carter in 1978 issued an Executive Order to govern the agency; even those rules may be too harsh, but at least an Executive Order can be corrected overnight whereas modifying a legislated charter could take months or even years.

The CIA also needs an increased budget to facilitate the improvement of its information-gathering and analysis operations and its clandestine activities. Though President Carter has promised a "significant" budget increase next year, the CIA's funds are now at a "rock-bottom" \$5 billion, according to informed estimates, and the boost in spending needs to be hefty.

Even if Congress and the President agree to rebuild the agency, we are not, however, optimistic that substantial improvements can be made anytime soon. The nation's intelligence network will likely take years to rebuild and, in the meantime, the U.S. will be exposed to unforeseen turns of events in vital areas around the globe. It is more than unfortunate that these improvements will have to be made from hindsight rather than foresight.

February 11, 1980.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

E 501

straightforward. The people must have the basic necessities—food, medicine, and shelter—but they also require the great influence of the United States to help them achieve political pluralism and secure respect for human dignity. To deny the President's request for supplemental assistance to Nicaragua would greatly weaken those forces in the country—among them, the Roman Catholic Church—which support political pluralism and human dignity.

STATEMENT OF RESPECT AND SUPPORT FOR THE LITHUA-NIAN PEOPLE IN THEIR STRUG-GLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

HON. ANTHONY TOBY MOFFETT

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1980

• Mr. MOFFETT. Mr. Speaker, 62 years after their Declaration of Independence was signed, the brave Lithuanian people continue their struggle against Russian armed presence in their homeland. On August 23, 1979, 45 people from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia petitioned the free world for consideration of their plight in the United Nations. The petitioners commemorated as a day of shame for the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which relegated Lithuania to the Russian sphere of influence for a payment of \$7.5 million to the German Reich. The signatories renew their request for freedom, independence, rights of selfdetermination, and the removal of all external military personnel from the Baltic States.

The principles of national autonomy and freedom from persecution have long been recognized in international law. In Lithuania, the Helsinki Monitoring Commission continues to report human rights violations prohibited under the Helsinki agreements despite the imprisonment last year of two of their seven members, Balas Gajauskas and Viktoras Petkus. Andrei Sakharov made public his support of the August 23 petition, as did the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Commission. Yet since then, two of the Lithuanians who signed the petition, Antamas Terlekas and Vypautas Skuordys, have been imprisoned for their political beliefs.

The Lithuanian people have an admirable record of resistance of oppression and cultural assimilation. The courageous individuals who risk their lives and liberty of these essential freedoms deserve our respect and support.

MORE DOLLARS EQUALS BETTER DEFENSE?

HON. ROMANO L. MAZZOLI

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1980

• Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, I voted against H.R. 5980, the countercyclical aid bill.

It was not an easy vote. Many of my political allies and cohorts in the House voted the other way.

They prevailed. But, I still believe the measure will not be cost effective in disbursing taxpayer funds.

It transfers too much money, to too few places for purposes that are not clearly defined in the legislation.

This may well describe the fiscal year 1981 defense requests in their present form.

We need a strong national defense apparatus and a vigorous intelligence network to defend America's vital national interests around the world.

But as the following article reprinted from the Wall Street Journal of February 1, 1980, suggests, the allocation of our defense dollars may not be the most cost-effective way to defend our vital national interests.

The article notes that the Western Alliance (NATO) today outspends the Warsaw Pact on defense.

Also, the article suggests that the deployment and design of our forces would indicate the United States is more prepared to fight brushfire wars in Asia and Africa than a conventional war against the Soviets.

Further, the article notes that our allies simply are not contributing their fair share to the alliance. The United States today provides more than half the outlays for NATO.

I would ask my colleagues to consider the following when reading this article: First, until America has a well thought out defense policy; second, until the United States can deploy tested weapons systems; and third, until our allies are willing to contribute their "fair share" to global defense needs.

America's defense and foreign policy goals will be hard to attain.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 1980]

RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING

(By Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera)

Even before recent events in Iran and Afghanistan, polls showed a dramatic upsurge in public support for more defense spending. The latest opinion survey, released last week, showed a larger plurality favoring more military spending than any national poll since 1950.

This popular view became official policy in December, as President Carter announced a decision to increase defense spending by 4.85 percent per year in real terms over the next five years. His budget confirmed the decision and already there is talk of higher spending over and above the budget figure. One former top national security official, John Lehman, recently rec-

ommended a 10 percent annual defense budget increase, after inflation adjustments. This newspaper suggested 20 percent.

Three basic considerations have been widely overlooked in this national rush to judgment on the defense question. First, few people seem to realize that the NATO states still spend more money on defense than do the Warsaw Pact countries, according to most estimates. The following figures are published by the respected Londonbased International Institute for Strategic Studies, and agree with data from the CIA:

1978 DEFENSE SPENDING

	Millions
United States	\$105,135 74,747
Total NATO	179,882
Soviet Union	148,000 12,406
Total Warsaw Pact	160,406

The Soviets outspend the United States, but taken as a whole the Western alliance outspends the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, about one-quarter of the Soviet defense effort is directed against China, rather than NATO, so these figures understate an actual NATO advantage of roughly three to two.

We should not conclude that the U.S. and NATO are without defense problems. Instead, we should ask if more defense spending is the answer.

The U.S./NATO objective is defensive. Defense is usually easier than conquest, if the defender chooses the right defense doctrine. If this is in fact the case, our military now has more than enough resources, as long as these resources are used wisely. If we are weak even though we outspend the Pact states, we should look for errors in our doctrine, force structure and choice of weapons before we spend even more.

Second, the United States still carries an unfair share of the NATO military spending burden.

The U.S. now spends 5.0 percent of her GNP on defense, compared with an average 3.5 percent for our 13 NATO allies. West Germany, for instance, spends only 3.4 percent of her GNP on defense; France spends only 3.3 percent; Italy spends only 2.4 percent; Canada spends only 1.8 percent; and Japan, not in NATO but still an ally, spends only 0.9 percent. Only Britain (4.7 percent) spends nearly what she should.

This inequity arose in the wake of World War II, when we agreed to carry the main burden of European defense while the European economies recovered from the war. Today, however, the West European standard of living approaches our own, and the total West European industrial capacity equals ours. Yet we still subsidize Western Europe's defense.

Why should we now increase this subsidy? Our European and Japanese allies depend on Persian Gulf oil far more than we, yet everyone now assumes that the defense of the Gulf is an exclusive American obligation.

Third, the current debate on defense spending is premised on a false image of the main direction of both the Soviet and American military effort.

Recent press accounts picture a looming Soviet military capacity to intervene in the developing world, and an atrophied American intervention capability. Administration statements indicate that most of the proposed new defense spending will be allocated to forces best structured for Third-World intervention, to counter this alleged Soviet threat.